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LICENSED TO STEAL: HAS SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY GONE TOO FAR?
SULAIMAN M. QAZI*

INTRODUCTION
Q Labs, a hypothetical small biotechnology company,
discovered and patented an enzyme used to catalyze a set of
State University, through its perusal of Q Labs'
reactions.'
research papers and presentations, was able to reproduce the
enzyme in its research facility. State University used the Q
enzyme in its own chemical reaction to produce an intermediate
compound which could not be manufactured without the use of the
patented enzyme. State University then sold the intermediate
compound to a major pharmaceutical company, which in turn used
the compound in its chemical process. The end product of the
pharmaceutical company's chemical process was the cure for
Parkinson's disease.
As the only supplier of the Parkinson's drug, the
pharmaceutical company was able to sell its product at an
exorbitant price. Consequently, State University was able to sell
its intermediate compound to the pharmaceutical company at any
price it desired. State University and the major pharmaceutical
company reaped enormous amounts of profit due to the
Parkinson's drug.
Q Labs was the only party in this scenario that did not realize
tremendous economic benefits from the drug. For years, Q Labs
was not aware of the fact that its Q enzyme patent was being
All over the country, public
infringed by State University.
and
graduate
students,
universities
have
professors,
undergraduate students working on thousands of different
projects. Those outside of the individual university departments
are rarely aware of the research being done in the respective
departments. Consequently, Q Labs did not immediately know
that the university violated its patent rights. Further, the fact
that the university sold a compound that can only be
* J.D. Candidate, June 2000.
1. This is a hypothetical situation used to demonstrate the issues and

problems addressed in this Comment.

Q Labs recognized the industrial

significance of its enzyme, and promoted the enzyme through research papers,
presentations, and advertisements.
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manufactured using the Q enzyme, and not the enzyme itself,
made it practically impossible for Q Labs to know that its patent
rights were being violated.
After. several years, Q Labs became aware of State
University's infringement of its Q enzyme patent.
Q Labs
immediately filed suit in federal court to protect its patent rights.
In spite of evidence that clearly showed that it had infringed the Q
enzyme patent, State University filed a motion to dismiss, which
the court granted, relying on the relevant patent laws and the
Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, while State University and the
major pharmaceutical company made millions of dollars from their
respective products that could not be manufactured absent the Q
enzyme, Q Labs did not benefit from its own patented discovery.
The University essentially stole the enzyme; and as a result, it did
not have to pay licensing fees that Q Labs was entitled to receive.
Consequently, Q Labs did not profit in any manner from the high
volume sales of the Parkinson's drug. Q Labs could not recover its
losses in the courts or enjoin the university from continuing to
blatantly infringe its Q enzyme patents because the university was
immune from patent infringement lawsuits.2
Until recently, the preceding hypothetical scenario allowed
states and state entities to "steal" patented products and processes
because the patent laws and the Eleventh Amendment effectively
made states and state entities immune from patent infringement
liability.' The Eleventh Amendment expressly prohibits suits
against the states by citizens of another state, or by citizens or
subjects of any foreign state.4 The Eleventh Amendment also
prohibits federal courts from hearing actions for damages
involving nonconsenting states. 5 When patent laws, which provide
for exclusive federal jurisdiction,' interact with the Eleventh
Amendment, states have broad protection against suits in federal

2. Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 334 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Chew sued the

state of California for patent infringement. Id. at 332. The plaintiff appealed

from an order dismissing the complaint on grounds of Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Id. The Court of Appeals held that Congress did not abrogate
state immunity from patent infringement claims through provisions of the
patent statute. Id. at 335.
3. R. Carl Moy, A Review of the Year in Patents 13 (Sept. 23, 1997)
(unpublished handout by Professor R. Carl Moy of the William Mitchell
College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota).

4. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment states: "[t]he
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." Id.
5. Blaney Harper, Intellectual Property and State Sovereign Immunity:
The Eleventh Amendment Under Scrutiny, COMPUTER LAw., July 1992, at 21.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1996).
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court.7 As a result, state entities often use the Eleventh8
Amendment as a shield from patent infringement liability.
However, Congress has the power to abrogate the sovereign
immunity of states.9 In 1992, by amending the patent laws,
Congress attempted to eliminate state claims of sovereign
immunity in this area.' ° However, the question of state liability
under the amended patent laws raises federalism issues."
This Comment examines the conflict between the United
States patent law amendments set forth in § 296 and § 271(h), and
the Eleventh Amendment, and the various attempts to resolve this
conflict. Part I explains the nature of the conflict between patent
rights and sovereign immunity, and explores its inception and
background by looking briefly at the Constitution and relevant
case and patent laws. Part II analyzes the effectiveness of the
congressional abrogation of state patent immunity in light of
recent case law. Finally, Part III discusses whether the Supreme
Court should follow the federal appellate court decisions and
proposes legal bases for doing so.
I. THE CONSTITUTION, CASE LAW, AND PATENT STATUTES
In order to understand the background of the conflict between
patent rights and the Eleventh Amendment, it is necessary to
examine the Constitution and relevant case law and patent
statutes. Section A explores the history and purpose of the
Eleventh Amendment. Section B examines the case law that
forms the foundation of the conflict. Section C examines the
relevant amendments to the patent laws.
A. The Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh amendment was enacted in response to the
1793 Supreme Court decision Chisholm v. Georgia." The
7. Harper, supra note 5, at 21. The Eleventh Amendment protection may

be limited due to the fact that states may consent to suit in federal court when
they file suit against a private entity. Id. Supreme Court opinions indicate

that "a state's consent to federal court jurisdiction is very limited." Id.
Because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent suits, the
Eleventh Amendment, coupled with patent laws, provides states with a strong
protection against suits in the federal system. Id.
8. Moy, supra note 3, at 13.

9. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1985).
Atascadero did not involve a patent right, but it did involve the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. at 238-40.
10. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (1992) (attempting to abrogate the
sovereign immunity of states).
11. Moy, supra note 3, at 13.

12. 2 U.S. 419 (1793). Chisholm involved a South Carolina citizen's suit
against the State of Georgia on behalf of a deceased South Carolina citizen's
estate. Id. at 420. The state of Georgia challenged the Court's original
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Chisholm court held that states were subject to the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction over suits between a state and citizens
of another state. 13 In response to the Court's decision in Chisholm,
Congress proposed a constitutional amendment that would
preclude suits in federal court against a state by citizens of
another state.1 4
The Eleventh Amendment was ratified and
expressly provided immunity to a state from suits in federal court
by a citizen of another state or foreign country. 5 The Eleventh
Amendment has been interpreted in numerous cases, which
6
initially expanded the reach of the amendment,"
and, more
recently, restricted the states' immunity to federal jurisdiction.'
A state may waive its constitutional immunity through a
state statute, its state constitution, or by participating in certain
federal programs. 8 Congress may also unilaterally abrogate state
immunity pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9

jurisdiction by refusing to enter an appearance. Id. at 470-71.
13. Id. at 420.
14. Peter A. Schwartz, Suing States After Seminole, J. PROPRIETARY RTS.,
Sept. 1997, at 2.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
16. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890). Hans sued the State of
Louisiana, in federal court, for violating the Contracts Clause of the
Constitution. Id. at 3. The Supreme Court held that the state of Louisiana
was immune from suit in federal court. Id. at 21. The Court based its decision
on the principle of state sovereign immunity. Id. at 13. Furthermore, the
Court stated that the Eleventh Amendment is also a bar to suits against a
state by its own citizens, although this is not expressly stated in the
Amendment. Id. at 10-12.
17. Kenneth S. Weitzman, Comment, The Authority to Abrogate State
Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity After Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co.?, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 297, 303 (1991). Substantial confusion has
been caused by the inconsistencies in decisions interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment. Id.
18 Id. at 307-11. In Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks
Department, 377 U.S. 184, 184-85 (1964), a state railroad employee sued the
state of Alabama, in federal court, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
The employee sought money damages for an injury suffered in the course of
his employment. Id. On the basis of its immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment, the State of Alabama contested the jurisdiction of the court. Id.
at 185-86. The Supreme Court held that Alabama had constructively waived
its Eleventh Amendment immunity via its participation in a federal program.
Id. at 196. The program was governed by a federal statute that authorized a
federal cause of action. Id. The Court felt that "the states had surrendered a
portion of their sovereignty" when they ratified the Constitution. Id. at 191.
However, in Welch v. Department of Highways & Public Transportation,483
U.S. 468, 477-78 (1987), the Court overruled the Parden decision by stating
that in the absence of an unequivocal indication that the state consents to
federal jurisdiction, no waiver will be inferred by the courts.
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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B. Relevant Case Law
Initially, courts did not allow state entities to use sovereign
immunity as a blanket defense to patent infringement actions.2"
In Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., plaintiff Lemelson sued Ampex and
the Illinois Bureau of Investigation (IBI) for patent infringement. 21
IBI asserted its immunity as a state entity and filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint.22 The court held that because the states
had granted Congress the exclusive right to grant patents, they
were not immune from patent lawsuits.2 ' Furthermore, the court
held that a patent owner should be able to protect his patented
interest for reasons of public policy.2 In stark contrast to future
decisions, the patent act was not, on its face, interpreted to exempt
states from liability.' Consequently, under the Lemelson decision,
states were liable for patent infringement in spite of the Eleventh
Amendment.26
27
In Edelman v. Jordan,
the United States Supreme Court
made the requirements for finding a waiver of Eleventh
Amendment state immunity much more stringent than the
standard used by the district court in Lemelson.' The Court held
that waiver of state Eleventh Amendment immunity must be
20. Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708, 714 (N.D. Ill. 1974). The
court offered several theories under which the patent owner's rights could be
protected. Id. at 711. The court reasoned that the patent was property, and
taking it without just compensation violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
The court also stated that governmental units act outside the scope of their
authority when they violate patent rights. Id. The court decided the case
under the theory that the states surrendered their sovereignty to patent suits
when they granted "Congress the right to create exclusive patents." Id. at 711.
21. Id. at 710. Ampex manufactured a video system that incorporated
Lemelson's invention. Id. IBI, an agency of the state of Illinois, purchased
and utilized the Ampex system. Id.
22. Id. IBI also claimed that the patent laws were not applicable to state
governments and that venue did not lie in the court. Id. The court held IBI
liable for patent infringement, even though IBI had not expressly consented to
the suit. Id.
23. Id. at 711. The court also expressed that the patent laws do not
expressly exclude states from their operation. Id.
24. Id. at 713. The court based this statement on the Pardendecision. Id.
25. Id. at 711.
26. Lemelson, 372 F. Supp. at 711.
27. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
28. Id. at 673. Plaintiff Jordan filed a complaint in the district court
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials who
administered federal-state programs in Illinois. Id. at 653. The Supreme
Court found that mere participation in the federal program did not result in
Illinois waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 673. The Court
distinguished the Pardendecision. Id. at 672. The Supreme Court stated that
Parden involved a congressional enactment that expressly authorized suits by
plaintiffs against states or state instrumentalities. Id. The Court explained
that in the case at hand, the congressional intent to abrogate state immunity
was "wholly absent." Id.
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stated so clearly that the text involved does not permit "any other
reasonable construction." 9
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer," the Supreme Court held that the

enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment limited
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 1 The Court found that
Congress had used its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity when it
authorized federal courts to award money damages to private
individuals who were discriminated against by a state
The Court held that the principles of state
government."
sovereignty and the Eleventh Amendment are limited by § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.33 Consequently, the Court held that
Congress can authorize private suits against states or state
officials under its Fourteenth Amendment power.4

29. Id. at 673. The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
barred the retroactive payment of benefits found to have been wrongfully
withheld. Id. at 669. The Court held that a state's participation in a federal
program was not sufficient to establish Illinois' consent to be sued. Id. at 673.
30. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In Fitzpatrick, male employees of the state of
Connecticut brought. a class action lawsuit alleging that Connecticut's
statutory retirement benefit plan discriminated against them on the basis of
sex. Id. at 448. The 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The district court held that the
Connecticut act violated Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination.
Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 449. The plaintiffs also sought retroactive retirement
benefits and attorney's fees. Id. at 449-50. The district court held that the
payment of retroactive benefits and attorney's fees from the state's treasury
would violate the Eleventh Amendment, and the holding in Edelman. Id. at
450. The court of appeals affirmed the decision, but reversed as related to the
attorney's fees. Id. at 450-51. Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued
that Congress has the constitutional power to allow their damages action
against Connecticut, and the Supreme Court agreed. Id. at 451, 456.
31. Id. at 454. The Supreme Court explained that "the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment are directed to, and they are to a degree restrictions
of State power." Id. at 454. The enforcement of these prohibitions is not an
invasion of state sovereignty. Id. The Constitution expressly gives authority
in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment for congressional interference in those
situations that are within the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
455.
32. Id. at 447-48.
33. Id. at 456. In relevant part, the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In addition, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
also states that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.,amend. XJV, § 5.
34. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456. When Congress uses its § 5 power, it
exercises its authority under one section of an Amendment whose other
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In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 5 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of the particularity with which the
Congressional abrogation of state immunity must be stated in a
statute or constitutional provision." The Court held that Congress
can abrogate the states' sovereign immunity from suit in the
federal court "only by making
its intention unmistakably clear in
37
the language of the statute."
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,' the Supreme Court
restricted the states' sovereign immunity in a plurality decision."

sections function as limitations on state authority. Id. In Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether Congress' ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity extended to
ordering state officials to conform to state law. 465 U.S. 89, 97 (1984).
Mentally challenged citizens brought a class action challenging the fact and
condition of their confinement in a state institution. Id. at 92. In dictum, the
Court said that federal courts, in exercising their Fourteenth Amendment
powers, cannot interfere with state Eleventh Amendment immunity in regards
to state matters. Id. at 102-03. The Court stated that its "[r]eluctance to infer
that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems
from the recognition of the vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
our federal system." Id. at 99. The principles of federalism are disturbed
when a federal court instructs state officials in regards to conforming their
conduct to state laws. Id. at 100. The Court reasoned that if federal courts
were allowed to interfere with state operations, problems of federalism would
arise in making the state appear in the courts of another sovereign. Id.
35. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
36. Id. at 239-41. An applicant for a position with a state hospital brought
action against the state and state officials under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. Id. at 236. The plaintiff contended that Congress, by enacting the
Rehabilitation Act, had abrogated State constitutional immunity. Id. at 241.
The Court held that the Rehabilitation Act did not abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment immunity of the states. Id. at 246. The requirement of
unequivocal statutory language subjecting the states to federal jurisdiction
was not met by the statute's general authorization for federal jurisdiction. Id.
37. Id. at 242. Prior to the Atascadero decision, patent owners were able to
recover damages against states for patent infringement in spite of the
Eleventh Amendment. H.R. REP. No. 101-960(I) (1990). However, since
Atascadero, the courts have denied patent owners relief for patent
infringement by state entities. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
38. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
39. Id. at 23. Union Gas Company's predecessors operated a plant that
produced coal tar as a waste. Id. at 5. The plant was dismantled, and
subsequently the state of Pennsylvania began flood control projects close to
the plant. Id. In the course of these projects, Pennsylvania pierced a coal tar
deposit, allowing it to drain into a creek. Id. Pennsylvania and the federal
government cleared the hazardous tar from the creek and the federal
government reimbursed Pennsylvania for all costs incurred in the cleanup
process. Id. at 6. This suit was a result of the federal governments attempt to
recover its costs. Id. The United States sued Union Gas, which in turn filed a
third party complaint against Pennsylvania. Id. The district court found that
Pennsylvania was immune under the Eleventh Amendment and dismissed the
complaint. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding Congress had not
clearly expressed its intent to hold states liable. Id. Union Gas petitioned the
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The Court held that Congress' authority to regulate commerce
includes the authority to abrogate state immunity from suit where
Congress found it necessary.4 ° The Court stated, in dictum, that
the Commerce Clause gives power to 4Congress and at the same
time takes power away from the states. '
In Chew v. California,4 a resident of Ohio sued the State of
California for patent infringement. 43 The district court rejected
Chew's argument that § 271(a)" of the patent code contained the
explicit congressional intent required to abrogate a state's
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.4 Section 271(a) reads:
"whoever without authority, makes, uses or sells any patented
invention.., infringes the patent."46 The court of appeals held
that "the general term 'whoever' was not the unmistakable
language of congressional intent necessary to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity" in light of the holding in Atascadero, and
affirmed."7
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, and while the petition was pending,
Congress amended the Act under which the original suit was filed, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.
Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals'
judgment, and remanded the case. Id. The Court of Appeals found that the
amended statute rendered the states liable for damages. Id. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed. Id.
40. Id. at 19-20. Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of the Court,
stated that Congress may unilaterally abrogate state constitutional immunity
with legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause, as long as it expresses its
intention to do so in unmistakably clear language. Id. Justice Brennan
believed that by ratifying the United States Constitution, the states
surrendered their Eleventh Amendment immunity to suits for money damages
in federal court whenever Congress decides to render them liable under its
constitutional authority. Id.
41. Id. at 19.
42. 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
43. Id. at 332. Chew invented a test that measured automobile exhaust
emissions. Id. The state of California asserted its sovereign immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment and filed a motion to dismiss the case. Id.
Subsequently, the district court dismissed the case. Id.
44. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982). "Except as otherwise provided in this title,
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." Id.
45. Chew, 893 F.2d at 334. Chew also offered several other arguments. Id.
at 335. Chew urged the court to consider public policy implications, the fact
that Congress' patent power is exclusive, and the fact that the federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over patent matters. Id. The court rejected all of
these arguments. Id. Chew also argued that, in effect, the state was taking
her property. Id. at 336. The court disposed of this argument by stating that
the proper party for a taking claim in this case would be the United States, not
California. Id.
46. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982).
47. Chew, 893 F.2d at 334-35. The court stated that the relevant patent
laws did not provide a statutory definition of "whoever", and furthermore, the
laws did not include "states" in the language. Id. at 335.
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48
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
the Supreme Court
held that Congress lacks the authority, under the Commerce
Clause or any other Article I power, to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 49
In
addition, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co." The Supreme Court, in Seminole, stated that in
order to determine whether Congress has abrogated state
sovereign immunity, two questions must be asked: "first, whether
Congress has 'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the
immunity'; and second, whether Congress has acted 'pursuant to a
valid exercise of power."''
Prior to the ruling in Seminole, the
Court had found authority to abrogate state immunity under only
two provisions of the Constitution: the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Interstate Commerce Clause." By overruling Union Gas,
the Supreme Court left Congress with only one method of
abrogating
state
sovereign
immunity,
the
Fourteenth
Amendment. 3 It remained to be seen whether federal courts
would use the holding in Seminole to disregard Congress' 1992
amendments to the patent laws.

C. Relevant PatentLaws
In 1992, Congress enacted amendments to the patent code in
an attempt to protect patent owners from patent infringement by
state entities.' The addition of § 271(h) and § 296 to the patent
code expressly abrogated state immunity from suit for violation of

48. 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996).
49. Id. at 1132. The Seminole Tribe of Indians sued the State of Florida.
Id. at 1121. Seminole alleged that Florida had refused to enter into good faith
negotiations required by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act under the Indian

Commerce Clause. Id. The Act authorizes a tribe to bring suit in federal court
against a state in order to force the state to negotiate in good faith. Id. at
1119. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts
the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent
the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction." Id. at 1131-32.
In spite of Congress' clear intent to abrogate state immunity, the suit was
subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 1133.
50. Id. at 1128. The Seminole Court noted that the plurality decision in
Union Gas, which held Congress could expand the federal courts' Article III
jurisdiction via Article I, contradicted the idea that Article III sets forth the
boundaries of federal court jurisdiction. Id. The Court concluded that Union
Gas was wrongly decided. Id.
51. Id. at 1123 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 1125. In Union Gas, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that
Congress had the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the
Commerce Clause. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989).

53. Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 1131 n.15. In this footnote, the majority states
that Congress' authority to abrogate state immunity via the Fourteenth

Amendment is undisputed. Id.
54. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 296, 271(h) (1992).
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patent law.5 5 Section 271(h) defines "whoever" to include "any
State, any instrumentality of a state," and "any officer or employee
of a state or instrumentality of a state acting in his official
capacity."56 Section 296 explicitly sets forth that states and state
entities "shall not be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine
of sovereign immunity" from a suit for patent infringement.5"
Although the amendments were specifically enacted to remedy the
conflict between the patent laws and the Eleventh Amendment,
disputes related to sovereign immunity still found their way into
the federal court system.
II. SECTION 296: THE CONFLICT AND THE CASES
The amendment of the patent laws 58 and the subsequent
Supreme Court decision in Seminole 9 brought the conflict between
patent rights and state sovereign immunity into the judicial
system.0 In order to ascertain whether § 296 has fulfilled the
legislative intent of abrogating state immunity related to patent

55. See id.

56. 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1992).
As used in this section, the term "whoever" includes any State, any
instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity. Any State, and
any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the
provisions of this title in the same manner and to the same extent as
any nongovernmental entity.
Id.
57. 35 U.S.C. § 296 (1992).
(a) In general-Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer
or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State, acting in his official
capacity, shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the
Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of
sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including
any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for infringement of a
patent under section 271, or for any other violation under this title. Id.
(b) Remedies-In a suit described in subsection (a) for a violation
described in that subsection, remedies (including remedies both at law
and in equity) are available for the violation to the same extent as such
remedies are available for such a violation in a suit against any private
entity. Such remedies include damages, interest, costs, and treble
damages under section 284, attorney fees under section 285, and the
additional remedy for infringement of design patents under section 289.
Id.
58. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 296, 271(h) (1992) (amending the modern
patent laws).
59. 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996).
60. G. Scott Thomas & Gary J. Sertich, Note, Recent Developments in
Patent Law, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 463, 482 (1997). Under Seminole, if the
amendments to the patent laws were enacted by Congress pursuant to its
authority under Article I, then Article III courts would not have jurisdiction
over infringement claims against state and state entities. Id.
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infringement lawsuits, 1 it is necessary to undertake a four-part
analysis of § 296 and subsequent judicial decisions. First, Section
A will analyze whether § 296 fulfills the requirements set forth in
various Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment. Second, Section B will determine whether § 296
fulfills the requirements set forth in the Seminole decision. Third,
Section C will review Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the University of
62
California
and Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,68 and their
treatment of the conflict. Finally, Section D examines College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board' and its treatment of the conflict.
A. Section 296 and the Requirements for Congressional
Abrogation
Supreme Court decisions have established a set of
requirements that must be met before Congress can abrogate a
state's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 9
Congress
must fulfill two requirements to abrogate state Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit: first, Congress must explicitly
state its intent to abrogate the immunity; and second, Congress
must act under a valid exercise of power.66
For § 296 to abrogate state sovereign immunity from patent
infringement suits, Congress must have unequivocally expressed
its legislative intent to do so. 7 In the alternative, federal courts
will only find a waiver of state immunity where the statutory text
involved does not allow any other reasonable construction.'
The legislative history and the wording of § 296 are evidence
of Congress' express intention to abrogate state immunity.69
Section 296(a) explicitly states that:
[alny State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or
employee of a State, acting in his official capacity, shall not be
immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the

61. H.R. REP. No 101-960(I), at 39 (1990). Title III added a new section, §
296, to Title 35 of the U.S. Code expressly abrogating state immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment.

Id. at 54. Section 296 also subjects states to

monetary liability for patent infringement. Id.
62. 939 F. Supp. 639, 642 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
63. 143 F.3d 1446, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
64. 148 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
65. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123.

66. Id.
67. Id. In Atascadero, the Court held that a general authorization for suit
would not suffice to abrogate state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985).
68. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
69. H.R. REP. No. 101-960(I), (1990). "Title III constitutes a proper exercise

of Congress' constitutional authority to abrogate State sovereign immunity."
Id. at 30.
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United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity,
from suit in Federal court by any person, including any
governmental or nongovernmental entity, for infringement of a
patent under section 271, or for any other violation under this title. 0
Congress expressed its unequivocal intention to override state
immunity from patent suits in § 296(a), and the language of the
statute does not allow for any other reasonable construction.'
Therefore, the first of the two requirements set forth by the
Supreme Court in Seminole was unquestionably satisfied by §
296. 7'
For § 296 to effectively abrogate state immunity from patent
lawsuits, Congress must also have enacted it under a valid
exercise of power. 3
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
allows Congress to abrogate the state's immunity from suit
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. 4 Therefore, Congress
acted under a valid exercise of power only if it enacted § 296 based
on its power under § 5, the enforcement provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment.7 '
The question of whether Congress
enacted § 296 under a valid exercise of power, and fulfilled the
second requirement of the test, must be answered in light of the
Seminole decision and subsequent case law, which the next section
of this Comment explores.
B.

Section 296 and the Seminole Decision

For § 296 to effectively abrogate state immunity from patent
infringement lawsuits, it must fulfill the second requirement of
6
the test set forth in Seminole."
This requirement states that to
abrogate state immunity, Congress must act under a valid exercise
of power." In Seminole, the Supreme Court held the Eleventh

70. 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1992).
71. See id.
72. H.R. REP. NO. 101-960(I), at 30 (1990).
73. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123. Congress acts under a valid exercise of
power when it passes the Act in question under a "constitutional provision
granting Congress the power to abrogate." Id. at 1125. Previously, the Court
"found authority to abrogate under only two provisions of the Constitution."
Id. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court held that under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment Congress may abrogate state immunity. 427 U.S. 445, 452-56
(1976). A plurality of the Supreme Court also upheld congressional abrogation
of state immunity in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989).
However, Seminole expressly overruled Union Gas. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at
1128.
74. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452-56. In Fitzpatrick, the Court stated that
the Constitution gives express authority for congressional interference in
those cases which fall within the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
455.
75. Thomas & Sertich, supra note 60, at 482.
76. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123.
77. Id.
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Amendment restricts the power of the judiciary under Article III,
and Congress cannot use its Article I powers to abrogate sovereign
8
immunity."
Based on a literal reading of the Seminole decision,
Congress can only abrogate state immunity from patent
infringement lawsuits via its authority under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9 Therefore, if Congress enacted § 296
and § 271(h) solely on the basis of its Article I powers, then Article
III courts would not have jurisdiction over infringement actions
against states and state entities.0
In order to determine if Congress enacted § 296 pursuant to a
valid exercise of its power under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
necessary to examine the legislative history of the law."1 The
House of Representatives report states that the enactment of § 296
could be characterized as an exercise of Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment powers.82 In its report pertaining to § 296, the Senate
stated that the law is justified as a method of enforcing
Congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Based
78. Id. at 1132. The Court made this statement to explain its rationale for
overruling Union Gas. Id. at 1131. The Court stated that even when the
Constitution grants Congress lawmaking authority under Article I, and
Congress enacts legislation pursuant to that authority, Congress cannot
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity. Id. at 1132.
79. Id. at 1131 n.15.
80. Thomas & Sertich, supra note 60, at 482. Justice Stevens' dissent in
Seminole expressly stated the conflict that would arise due to the majority
decision. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 n.1. The dissent stated that since
"federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under.., federal
laws," the majority decision would protect states from being subject to federal
jurisdiction for violations of federal laws. Id. The majority, in response to
Justice Stevens, stated that the Court did not award relief against the states
in those situations prior to Seminole. Id. at 1132 n.16.
81. Congress has authority under Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the Constitution
to promote the progress of science and the arts by granting patent rights. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Based on this authority, Congress enacted a patent
statute in 1790, and the patent laws were subsequently amended in 1793,
1836, and 1952. H.R. REP. No. 101-960(I), at 27 (1990). The legislative
history of the patent laws does not evince a congressional intent to exempt
states from liability for patent infringement. Id.
82. H.R REP. No. 101-960(I), at 31 (1990). Professor Glen Reynolds wrote a
letter to Chairman Kastenmeier stating "[t]his bill could be characterized
as... an exercise of Congress' powers under the Fourteenth Amendment
which among other things authorizes Congress to pass 'appropriate legislation'
to prevent States depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law or denying them the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 40.
Professor Reynolds also stated that Congress could enact the bill under its
Commerce Clause powers, or its power to promote the progress of the sciences
and useful arts. Id. Obviously, the report was written prior to the Seminole
decision, which ruled out the Commerce Clause as a basis for the abrogation of
state immunity. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1119.
83. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, S. REP.
No. 102-280, at 7-8 (1992). The Senate Report states that the purpose of the
Act was to clarify Congress' intent to abrogate state immunity from
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on both the House and Senate reports, it is apparent that
Congress enacted § 296 under its Fourteenth Amendment
powers.' Consequently, based on its legislative record and express
wording, § 296 satisfies the second requirement of the Seminole.85
Section 296 effectively eliminates state immunity as to patent
lawsuits because it fulfills both requirements of the Seminole test:
first, Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate state
immunity via § 296; and second, Congress acted under a valid
exercise of power." However, it remained to be seen whether the
courts would uphold Congress' legislative intent to abrogate state
immunity via § 296.
C. The Genentech Case
Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co. was the first major case to

address the issue of whether Congress' legislative intent in
enacting § 296 would be upheld.87 Genentech filed a declaratory
action against the University of California and Eli Lilly.' The
University asserted its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment and sought to have the suit dismissed. 9 The District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana dismissed the action on
the ground that the University was immune under the Eleventh
Amendment."
infringement suits under the patent laws. Id. at 2-4, 7. The Report also
expresses that because Congress is granted exclusive power to promote the
sciences by granting patent rights, it logically follows that Congress must also
have the power to abrogate state immunity in order to protect patent holders.
Id. at 8. The Senate stated that courts have recognized patent rights as
property, and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from taking
property without due process of law. Id. The Senate determined that if states
were allowed to infringe patent rights, they would suppress future innovation.

Id.
84. See generally H.R REP. No. 10 1-960(I); S. REP. No. 102-280.
85. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123 (describing this requirement).
86. See id. (discussing what is needed to abrogate state immunity).
87. Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. IP 90-1679-C (S.D. Ind. Mar. 7,
1991).
88. Genentech, 998 F.2d at 935. Genentech's action requested that the
court declare that the University's patent ('877) was invalid and that
Genentech had not infringed on the patent. Id. Genentech also sought a
declaration that '877 was unenforceable because it was obtained through
deception of the Patent and Trademark Office. Id. In addition, Genentech
alleged that a waiver from the Department of Health and Human Services was
obtained by the University through deceptive acts. Id. Genentech also stated
that the University was estopped from enforcing '877 against it because of
previous contractual obligations. Id. Finally, Genentech raised claims based
on antitrust, patent misuse and state tort law. Id. The very next day, the
University filed a patent infringement suit against Genentech. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. The court made its decision in reliance upon the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Id. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and that Genentech had failed to
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On appeal, Genentech argued that the University had waived
its immunity from patent claims by virtue of its participation in
the patent system. 91 The University disputed that it had waived
its immunity, and furthermore, argued that § 296 applied to
patent infringement by the states, and not declaratory actions
against the states. 9 2 However, the University conceded that § 296
had abrogated state sovereignty as to patent infringement
lawsuits. 93 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit held that the University was not immune to the suit as to
the patent claims.9 As to the specific issue of whether § 296
abrogated state immunity from declaratory actions, the court
answered in the affirmative.95 The court based its findings on the
1992 patent law amendments.'
The court vacated the district
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 935-36. The court also stated that in
the alternative, it had exercised its discretion not to hear the declaratory
judgment action. Id. Genentech appealed the judgment. Id. at 935.
91. Id. at 940. Genentech stated that because patent rights are exclusively
enforceable in federal court, when the University had filed suit, and been
counter sued, it had waived its immunity. Id. The court declined to decide the
issue of whether the University had waived its immunity. Id.
92. Id. at 941. Additionally, the University argued that the patent law
amendments did not abrogate its immunity as to Genentech's antitrust, tort
and contract claims. Id. Genentech countered the University's assertion by
presenting the plain language of the amendments, the legislative history of
the Act, and the absence of exceptions in both the statute and the legislative
history. Id.
93. Id. The University agreed that the amendments overruled Chew v.
California. Id. Consequently, the University admitted that absolute state
immunity from patent lawsuits no longer existed. Id.
94. Genentech, 998 F.2d at 935-36. In dictum, the court said that when the
text and the legislative intent of a statute are clear, and when the intent is
furthered by the statute, the court's inquiry is complete. Id. at 941-42. The
court discussed the methods and requirements necessary for congressional
abrogation of state immunity set forth in case law. Id. at 939-40. Since this
case preceded the Seminole decision, the Union Gas holding was still valid.
The court also found that the district court's dismissal on discretionary
grounds was improper. Id. at 939.
95. Id. at 944. The University stated that the amendments do not
expressly mention the approval of declaratory judgment actions against the
states. Id. at 943. Genentech countered that the University did not possess
immunity from a declaratory judgment action because the University had by
its actions created the need for Genentech's action. Id. The court found that
the controversy arose when the University accused Genentech of patent
infringement, and the University was not immune, under the Eleventh
Amendment, from Genentech's responses to the accusations. Id. More
importantly, the court stated that allowing the state to claim immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment would be contrary to the legislative intent of
treating all parties equally in patent claims. Id.
96. Id. at 941. The court found that the amendments expressly abrogated
state immunity from patent suits. Id. at 942. The court pointed out that the
legislative history of the amendments clearly states Congress' intent to
abrogate state immunity in patent lawsuits. Id. The court also recognized
that the University's position was supported because the headings of the

The John Marshall Law Review

[32:779

court's dismissal of the patent related claims, and remanded the
case to the district court. 9
On remand, the University reasserted its contention that it
was immune from the suit under the Eleventh Amendment.9"
Several years after it had filed its answer, the University filed a
motion to dismiss the lawsuit.9 9 The University cited the recent
Seminole decision as the basis for its motion. °° The University
argued that after Seminole, Congress did not have the power to
abrogate its immunity from Genentech's declaratory judgment
action. 1 Genentech countered the University's argument using
the Patent and Copyright Clause.0 . and the Fourteenth
Amendment 10 3 to establish that Congress had the power to
abrogate the University's immunity."° Based on the holding in
Seminole, the court stated that if § 296 was enacted by Congress
solely pursuant to its Article I powers, then the court did not have
jurisdiction under Article III."00
Genentech advanced the
proposition that Congress enacted § 296 pursuant to its
Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause powers. 0 6 The
court agreed with Genentech's proposition that § 296 was enacted,
in part, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore it
T

amendments mentioned only infringement. Id. However, the headings could
not override the plain meaning of the text. Id. The court stated that it did not
have to address the question of whether the University had constructively
waived its immunity, because the patent law amendments were sufficient to
support the decision. Id. at 940.
97. Id. at 949. The court said that the University was not immune to the
portions of the suit involving patent claims, and the district court, on remand,
should determine which of Genentech's claims were properly set forth. Id.
98. Genentech, 939 F. Supp. at 641. In its answer to Genentech's amended
complaint, the University also asserted a patent infringement counterclaim.
Id.
99. Id. The motion to dismiss was filed on April 29, 1996. Id.
100. Id. at 641-42. The Seminole case was decided on March 27, 1996.
Seminole, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1114 (1996).
101. Genentech, 939 F. Supp. at 642.
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
104. Genentech, 939 F. Supp. at 642. Genentech also argued that the
University had waived its immunity. Id. Genentech did not contest the
University's assertion that it was an arm of the state, and thus entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id.
105. Id. at 643.
106. Id. In short, Genentech argued that patents were property, § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from taking property without due
process, and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with the
authority to enforce § 1. Id. Consequently, Genentech felt that Congress had
acted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted § 296. Id.
Genentech agreed that Congress had also used its powers under the
Commerce Clause. Id. Genentech supported its propositions by presenting
the legislative history of § 296. Id.
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was valid. 0 7 However, the court found that § 296 did not further
Genentech's position.
The court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment itself limited Congress' power in this case because
Genentech was not the owner of the patent.0 8 The court held that
since Genentech did not own the patent, it had not been deprived
of property without due process, and consequently § 296 did not
abrogate the University's immunity as to the declaratory judgment
action."' Therefore, the court granted the University's motion to
dismiss."0 In summary, the court held that § 296 abrogated state
immunity as to patent infringement actions against the state, but
it did not render the states subject to declaratory action
judgments."'
Genentech appealed the district court's decision to dismiss its
declaratory judgment action."' Genentech argued that if it was
not allowed to bring a declaratory judgment action, it would be
deprived of its constitutional rights under the Fifth and
Genentech's
argument
also
Fourteenth Amendments." 3
implicated the doctrine of constructive waiver."' The University
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress5
the power to allow for declaratory judgment actions under § 296.1

107. Id.

108. Id. If Genentech owned the patent, and it filed a suit against the
University for patent infringement, then Congress could use its power under
the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the University's immunity. Id.
Furthermore, the court agreed with Genentech that a patent was property,
and to allow states to infringe on the patent right would constitute a taking
without due process of law, thus violating the Constitution. Id.
109. Id. Genentech could freely manufacture the substances patented by the
University until the University secured a judgment in its favor. Id. As a
result, Genentech was guaranteed due process before it lost its rights to
manufacture. Id. at 643-44.
110. Genentech, 939 F. Supp. at 646.
111. Id. at 643-44. "[We do not believe the statutory amendments in issue
can be interpreted under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate UC's
sovereign immunity." Id. at 644. "We believe that doing so would require that
we apply the subject statutes in an unconstitutional manner." Id. The court
also dismissed Genentech's waiver claim. Id. at 646.
112. Genentech, Inc. v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
113. Id. at 1451. Genentech argued that it would be deprived of both
property and liberty without due process. Id. Genentech stated that if it was
not allowed the same remedies as the University, it would also be deprived of
equal protection under the law. Id. In addition, Genentech asserted that §
296 was constitutional because it was empowered by the Patent Clause of the
Constitution. Id.
114. Id. Genentech pointed out that the University acted voluntarily,
obtained the benefits of the patent system, and attempted to enforce its patent
rights through the judicial system. Id. at 1451.
115. Id. at 1452. TheUniversity also stated that Genentech does not have a
property interest in infringing the University's patents. Id. Genentech
countered that its property was commercial in nature, and the Seminole Court
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The court declined to decide whether the Fourteenth
Amendment grants Congress the power to allow for declaratory
judgment actions under § 296.116 The court stated that it was not
necessary to decide the constitutional question because the
University had constructively waived its immunity and consented
to the declaratory judgment action.117 Consequently, the court held
that the declaratory judgment action was improperly dismissed by
the district court, and remanded the case for further
proceedings." 8
D. College Savings Bank
In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board,"9 the New Jersey District Court was
confronted with the exact scenario that § 296 was meant to
remedy. 1" College Savings Bank filed suit for patent infringement
against Florida Prepaid, a state entity. 12' A short time after the
could not have intended to eliminate declaratory judgment actions that,
because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of patent cases, cannot be
remedied elsewhere. Id.
116. Id. The court also declined to decide whether § 296 supplied a
constitutionally valid remedy for patent infringement by the state. Id. at
1453.
117. Id. at 1453. In finding a waiver, the court placed weight on the fact
that the University created a case or controversy that could only be resolved in
the federal courts. Id. The court also placed weight on the fact that the
controversy concerned federally created property rights that could only be
enforced by the use of federal judicial power. Id. The court explicitly stated
that the act of obtaining a patent, standing alone, would not be considered a
waiver of state immunity. Id.
118. Id. at 1454.
119. 948 F. Supp. 400 (D.N.J. 1996).
120. Id. at 406. The plaintiff, College Savings Bank, is a chartered bank
located in Princeton, New Jersey. Id. at 401. The defendant, Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Expense Board, is an entity of the state of Florida, created by a
Florida statute to run the Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Program. Id.
121. Id.
College Savings alleged that it had patented a method,
CollegeSure® CD, which it utilized in administration of a deposit contract. Id.
CollegeSure® CD was intended to provide a sufficient return to meet college
expenses. Id. Through its Expense Program, Florida Prepaid also provided a
return on money invested that was sufficient to meet college education costs.
Id. at 402. Both the College Savings and Florida Prepaid programs provided
returns for college expenses, even though those future expenses were
unknown. Id. at 401-02. On November 7, 1994, College Savings brought suit
against Florida Prepaid for infringement of its patented method for
administration of a deposit contract. Id. at 402. Specifically, College Savings
alleged that the data processing apparatus and the methods used by Florida
Prepaid directly infringed the College Savings patent. Id. In response to
College Savings' Patent Act Claim, Florida Prepaid filed a counterclaim that
sought a declaration that the College Savings patent was "invalid,
unenforceable, and void." Id. Florida Prepaid then -filed a motion seeking
either to dismiss the patent claim, or alternatively, to transfer -the case to the
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Supreme Court's decision in Seminole, Florida Prepaid filed a
motion to dismiss College Savings' patent claim.122 Florida Prepaid
stated that the court must dismiss College Savings' claims for two
reasons: first, Congress amended the statutes in question,
including § 296, under its Article I powers, and consequently the
statutes are unconstitutional pursuant to the decision in Seminole;
and second, if Congress did amend the statutes pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, the statutory amendments are not
appropriate because they do not remedy the types of actions that
the Fourteenth Amendment expressly prohibits."u In response to
Florida Prepaid's motions to dismiss, the court stated that § 296 is
a valid exercise of Congressional authority under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and consequently, Florida Prepaid's
immunity from suit was abrogated."u
In order to determine whether Florida Prepaid's immunity
was abrogated by § 296, the court conducted a two part inquiry:
first, "whether Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate the immunity; and second, whether Congress has acted
pursuant to a valid exercise of power." 12 5 For part one of the
inquiry, the court examined the text of § 296 and found that it was
"more than clear enough to abrogate State Eleventh Amendment
immunity for suit thereunder in federal court." 126 For part two of

Northern District of Florida on the basis of forum non-conveniens. Id. at 403.
The court denied Florida Prepaid's motions. Id. Subsequently, the court
granted College Savings' motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaims
upon concluding that a government agency could not maintain an action for
either libel or defamation. Id. at 403.
122. Id. at 406. Within two months of the Seminole decision, Florida
Prepaid filed a motion to dismiss the Patent Act claims. Id. Interestingly
enough, in Genentech, the University filed its motion to dismiss immediately
after the Seminole decision. Genentech, 939 F. Supp. at 642.
123. College Say. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 406. Florida Prepaid's constitutional
challenges were certified by the court and sent to the Attorney General. Id.
The Department of Justice requested that the court allow the United States to
intervene in the action, and the court obliged. Id. In response to Florida
Prepaid's motions to dismiss, College Savings asserted that Florida Prepaid
had waived its immunity, and § 296 was enacted under the Fourteenth
Amendment, therefore it abrogated Florida Prepaid's immunity. Id. at 406.
124. Id. at 421. The court said Congress unequivocally expressed its intent
to abrogate sovereign immunity under the patent amendments, and it had
acted under a proper exercise of authority. Id. College Savings also asserted
that Florida Prepaid waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by engaging
in activities' that Congress had indicated would subject it to suit in federal
court. Id. In addition, College Savings raised the following arguments: (1)
Florida Prepaid is not an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes,
and is not entitled to immunity; and (2) even if Florida Prepaid was entitled to
sovereign immunity, it waived its immunity through its actions in the suit. Id.
at 406.
125. See id. at 420 (quoting Seminole, 116 S. Ct. 114, 123 (1996)).
126. Id. at 420-21. The Court also mentioned that the language of § 296 was
clearer than, the language that the Supreme Court found sufficient in
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the inquiry, the court acknowledged that after the Seminole
decision, the only remaining congressional authority to abrogate
state immunity is § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 7 If a patent
is considered a "property" right, then legislation that renders the
states liable in federal court for violation of that right is clearly
enforceable under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.1" The court
said that the deciding constitutional issue was whether the
interests that the patent laws protect are "property" interests for
the purpose of Fourteenth Amendment analysis. 29 The court
examined precedent holding that a patent is "property" for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 3 ° Consequently, the court held
that Congress, under the Fourteenth Amendment, can abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity for patent claims.'
The court
also held that the patent law amendments, including § 296, which
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states, are a
valid exercise of Congressional power pursuant to § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3 2 The court denied Florida Prepaid's
motions to dismiss as to the patent claims. 33
Florida Prepaid appealed the district court decision to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.'
On appeal,
Florida Prepaid argued that "the goal of the patent law
amendments, which is to prevent states from violating patent
rights or obliging them to compensate patent owners when they do
so, is not a legitimate objective under the Fourteenth
Amendment." 135 The court disagreed, holding that preventing
state infringement of privately held patents is a "legitimate

Seminole, where the language in the statute did not even refer to the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. at 420.
127. Id. at 421.
128. Id. at 422. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress
the power to exercise its discretion in determining what legislation, if any, is
required to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
129. College Say. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 422.

130. Id. at 425. The law is clear that a patent is property. Hartford-Empire
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945).
131. College Sav. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 425.

The court rationalized that

Congress has the authority to enforce all of the Fourteenth Amendment,
including the Due Process Clause. Id. at 425-26. As a result, Congress can,
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, pass legislation to provide federal
jurisdiction for cases involving patent owners deprived of their "property"

without compensation and due process of law. Id. at 426.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
148 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

135. Id. at 1349. Florida Prepaid claimed that since the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted due to racial discrimination, congressional authority
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was limited to statutes that prevent
discrimination. Id.
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congressional objective under the Fourteenth Amendment. " 136
Florida Prepaid argued that even if it had deprived College
Savings Bank of property, the requirements of due process were
satisfied because College Savings could have sought relief in
Florida through a claims bill." 7 The court held that the fact that
the state of Florida may have some process available to a patent
owner whose rights have been violated does not preclude Congress
from exercising its Fourteenth Amendment powers through the
patent law amendments.118 Florida Prepaid also argued that the
patent law amendments allowed Congress to abrogate state
immunity under its Article I powers, which was prohibited after
the Seminole decision.!
The court also disagreed with this
argument.140 The court explained that because the Fourteenth
Amendment, unlike Article I, was enacted after the Eleventh
Amendment, it expressly limits the principle of sovereign
immunity. 14'
Florida Prepaid then argued that even if the
objectives of the patent law amendments were constitutionally
legitimate, the means employed by Congress to further the
objectives are out of proportion to the harms that the patent
amendments attempt to prevent. 142 The court held that the burden
136. Id. The court stated that the Supreme Court has expanded Fourteenth
Amendment protection beyond just prohibiting racial discrimination. Id.
137. Id. at 1350. Florida Prepaid argued that this form of relief provided
sufficient process to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny. Id.
138. Id. at 1350. The court stated the patent law amendments abrogate
state immunity irrespective of whether a state provides due process in its own
courts. Id. at 1351. The court also pointed out that if it were to follow Florida
Prepaid's suggestion, statutes enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment
would have to take into account the various remedies offered by the states,
thereby preventing the statute from being uniformly applied. Id. at 1350-51.
139. College Say. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1351. Florida Prepaid's rationale was
that Congress could create a system of property under its Article I powers,
patents in this case, then pass a statute that expressly renders states
amenable to suits for deprivation of that property. Id. Florida Prepaid
asserted that based on this rationale, Congress could accomplish indirectly
through the Fourteenth Amendment what it is not allowed to do directly
through Article I. Id.
140. Id. at 1351.
141. Id. The court said that since by adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the states relinquished to the government a part of their
authority, it must have been within their understanding that they limited
their Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 1352. The court added that
patents were viewed as property at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted. Id. The court said that Florida Prepaid's assertion that patents
should not be protected was tantamount to stating that Congress may not
abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id.
142. Id. Florida Prepaid complained that Congress did not show evidence of
widespread patent infringement by the states, and absent such a showing, the
abrogation of state immunity was not allowable. Id. at 1353. The court stated
that significant instances of patent infringement by states and state entities
were on record. Id. The legislative history also indicated that as state
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the patent law amendments place on the states is slight compared
to the potential harm to patent holders, who would be unable to
fully enforce their patent rights absent the abrogation of sovereign
immunity. 4 3 Therefore, the court found that abrogation of state
Eleventh Amendment immunity under the patent law
amendments was proper.'" Consequently, the appellate court
affirmed the district court decision denying Florida Prepaid's
motion to dismiss the patent infringement claim was affirmed.'45
Florida Prepaid petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari.' 6 The petition was granted on January 8, 1999.14' The
Supreme Court heard College Savings Bank on April 20, 1999.1
III. PROPOSALS
At the present time, the status of the law is as follows: § 296
renders states and -state entities subject to patent infringement
actions; 4 9 however, states are immune from declaratory judgment
Individuals
actions absent constructive waiver or consent."'
involved with intellectual property consider the conflict between
sovereign immunity and the patent law amendments to be a
critical issue which the Supreme Court must clarify."' This Part
of the Comment submits proposals under which the Supreme
Court can resolve the conflict between patent rights and sovereign

universities become more active in the intellectual property arena, the number
of patent lawsuits involving the states would continue to increase. Id. at 1354.
143. Id. at 1355. The court said that absent the right to sue a state for
patent infringement, a patent would decrease in value. Id. The court
emphasized that the patent law amendments do not place any greater burden
on states and state entities than those shouldered by private patent holders.
Id. at 1355.
144. College Sa'. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1355.
145. Id. The court said that "Congress clearly expressed its intent to
abrogate sovereign immunity," and "exercised its intent pursuant to a valid

constitutional exercise of power." Id.
146. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.v. College Sav. Bank,
119 S.Ct. 790, 790 (1999).
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Patent Act amendments, which abrogate State Eleventh Amendment
immunity, are 'appropriate legislation' under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. The appellate court stressed that there is "no sound reason
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Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d. 1343, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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immunity, and clarify the law in this area. In order to offer
proposals that advance Congress' intent, it is necessary to
determine exactly what the amendments were meant to remedy,
and what remedies are available.
Section A examines the
congressional record to determine the intent of the amendments,
and the remedies available under these amendments. Section B
discusses the appellate court holdings in College Savings Bank5
and Genentech,"' and how they may be modified to resolve the
conflict. Section C discusses the doctrine of constructive waiver,
and how it may be applied to the patent arena.
A. The CongressionalRecord
The House of Representatives Report states that the intent of
the amendments is to abrogate "state sovereign immunity in
patent law,.., notwithstanding the provisions of the Eleventh
Amendment... .""' The House of Representatives also found that
the amendments met the requirements set forth in the Supreme
Court decisions... and that they were enacted under a valid
exercise of congressional authority. 156 The Report added that
plaintiffs could recover all forms of available relief, including
money damages." ' However, the Subcommittee refused to specify
injunctive relief and declaratory judgments, because they were
already available."
The House Report, in setting forth § 296,
expressly stated that the remedies available against the states
included declaratory and injunctive relief.' 59
152. 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

153. 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
154. H.R. REP. No. 101-960(I), at 2 (1990). The report also mentions that
the amendments assure "that patent owners can recover damages from states
that infringe their patents." Id. "[The] legislation is necessary to clarify that

states are monetarily liable for patent infringement if patent holders are to
recover damages." Id. The legislation "responded to various judicial decisions
finding that State sovereign immunity was a bar to the recovery of money
damages in... patent infringement suits." Id. at 5.
155. Id. "[T]he language of the statute effectively meets the requirements
set forth in Atascadero and in more recent Supreme Court decisions to
effectively abrogate the current State immunity in the patent law." Id. at 31.
156. Id. "This bill could be characterized as an exercise of Congress' power
to regulate interstate commerce, as an exercise of Congress' power 'to promote
the Progress of Science and the useful arts' or as an exercise of Congress'

powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.... " Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. Witnesses who testified before the Subcommittee had requested
that the bill be amended to include declaratory and injunctive relief against
the states. Id. The Subcommittee denied the request because the requested
remedies were corrective, and more importantly, "are already available

against the states." Id.
159. H.R. REP. No. 101-960(I), at 43. "This section enumerates such
remedies so that it will be absolutely clear that, in addition to injunctive and
declaratory relief, the remedies of damages (including treble damages),
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The Senate Report similarly states that the amendments
were introduced to explicitly establish that states could be subject
to patent infringement suits in federal court.16 ° The Senate found
that the amendments were justified under the Commerce
Clause,'' the Patent Clause, 6 2 and § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 6' It found that sovereign immunity from patent
infringement lawsuits
was likely to discourage
future
innovation.'" The Report concluded that the patent amendments
were a valid exercise of Congress' power to abrogate state
immunity. 6' The final
version of the Act, in § 296(b), provided for
166
remedies in equity.

Any proposed solution to the conflict must further Congress'
legislative intent. It must allow for patent infringement suits
against states and state entities.61
Furthermore, the proposed
solution must allow for declaratory and injunctive relief against
states and state entities.'6
B. Modification of the Appellate Court Decisions
The decision in the College Savings Bank case furthered
Congress' intent to render states subject to patent infringement
interest, costs, attorneys fees and the remedy for infringement of design
patents will be available in patent infringement suits against states." Id. The
Report also expressly stated that remedies in equity were available against
the states. Id. "Thus, it makes clear that remedies that are currently
available, such as declaratory and injunctive relief, will continue to be
available to patentees suing for violation of our Nation's patent laws." Id.
160. S. REP. No. 102-280, at 6 (1992). The bill also stated that all remedies
available against private parties would be available against the states. Id.
161. Id. After Seminole, this is no longer a valid authority under which
Congress may abrogate state immunity. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116
S. Ct. 1114, 1132 (1996).
162. S.REP. No. 102-280, at 6. Congress has exclusive power to promote the
sciences through grants of patent rights. Id. As a consequence, Congress
should have the authority to render states liable to patent infringement
lawsuits. Id.
163. Id. The courts have held that patents are property, and the Fourteenth
amendment prohibits a state from taking property without due process. Id. at
7.
164. Id. "The need to abrogate State sovereign immunity for intellectual
property is clear for several reasons." Id. The allowance of immunity was
against the principle of article I, § 8,clause 8 of the Constitution, granting
Congress the power to issue patents. Id.
165. Id. The Report pointed out that Congress did not intend for states to be
immune from patent infringement suits in federal court. Id. Sections 296 and
271(h) will provide a uniform system of protection. Id.
166. See 35 U.S.C. § 296(b) (1992) (stating that 'remedies (including
remedies at both at law and in equity) are available for the violation to the
same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in a suit
against any private entity.").
167. S.REP. No. 102-280, at 6.
168. Id.
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suits. 16 9 However, in Genentech, the appellate court did not
implement Congress' intent to unconditionally render states
subject to declaratory actions. 7 ° As a consequence, the case law
involving § 296 does not provide plaintiffs
access to the full range
171
of remedies that Congress intended.
The discrepancy between Congress' intent and the decision in
Genentech can be resolved by the Supreme Court via a literal
reading of § 296.
Section 296(b) states in pertinent part:
"[r]emedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are
available for the violation to the same extent as such remedies are
available for such a violation in a suit against any private
entity."1 7'
The legislative history of § 296 also makes it
unequivocally clear that Congress intended that the states are
subject to declaratory actions.'73 Therefore, a literal reading of §
296(b) would resolve the confusion caused by the Genentech
decision.
Section 296 renders the states subject to patent
infringement, injunctive, and declaratory actions. This is exactly
what Congress intended, and the Supreme Court should, when
interpreting § 296, show deference to the clear legislative intent.
C. The Waiver Doctrine
The Supreme Court should find that states and state entities
are amenable to patent suits in federal court because the states
have constructively waived their sovereign immunity as to
patents. In Genentech, the court found a constructive waiver of
sovereign immunity.174 In finding a waiver, the court placed
weight on several factors, including the "voluntary and deliberate
creation of a case or controversy that can be resolved only in
federal courts, concerning federally-created property rights of
national75 scope that are enforceable only by federal judicial
power."
Patent rights are federally created property rights that are

169. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
148 F.3d. 1343, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The appellate court stressed that "there
is no sound reason to hold that Congress cannot subject a state to the same
civil consequences that face a private party infringer." Id.
170. Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446, 1452
(Fed. Cir. 1998). The appellate court declined to answer the constitutional
questions involved, and instead found that the University had constructively
waived its sovereign immunity. Id. at 1452-53.
171. See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 6. See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-960(I), at 31
(1990).
172. 35 U.S.C. § 296(b) (1992) (emphasis added).
173. See S. REP. No. 102-280. See also H.REP. No. 101-960(I), at 43.
174. Genentech, 143 F.3d at 1453.

175. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1996). Therefore, it is unreasonable to assert, as the
Genentech court did, that the requirements of a constructive waiver cannot be
satisfied unless the wrongdoing state initiates a lawsuit.
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national in scope. A state that creates or is otherwise involved in
a dispute involving patent rights undeniably invokes federal
judicial power because the case or controversy can only be resolved
in the federal judicial system. Therefore, all participants in the
federal patent system, including states, must be subject to actions
in the federal judicial system. Consequently, the Supreme Court
should hold that states that actively participate in the patent
system and become involved in patent disputes have
constructively waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity and
consented to actions in federal court as to those disputes.
CONCLUSION

States and state entities play a large part in the intellectual
property arena. The Eleventh Amendment, coupled with the
Supreme Court decision in Seminole, allows states and state
entities to exploit the patent system to their advantage. Prior to
the College Savings Bank and Genentech cases, the states were
allowed to, quite literally, steal intellectual property without
penalty.
The appellate court in College Savings Bank held that § 296
abrogated state immunity from patent infringement actions.
However, the Genentech decision indicates that states are immune
from declaratory actions, absent waiver or consent. Therefore, at
the present time, states and state entities are subject to patent
infringement actions, but not declaratory actions.
As a
consequence, states are held to a different standard of liability
than private patent holders, who are subject to both patent
infringement and declaratory actions.
The College Savings Bank case will be heard by the Supreme
Court on April 20, 1999. The Supreme Court must use that
opportunity not only to resolve the conflict between the patent law
amendments set forth in § 296 and § 271(h) and sovereign
immunity, but to eliminate the lax standard of liability that states
are currently held.
The Supreme Court should find that § 296 constitutionally
abrogates sovereign immunity, as all courts that have addressed
the issue in College Savings Bank and Genentech have found.
Furthermore, the Court should hold states and state entities to the
same standards as private patent owners, as Congress intended.
The Supreme Court should expressly hold that the states are
amenable to patent infringement lawsuits as well as actions for
declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court should also find that
the same remedies that are currently available in the private
sector will be available against the states. The current system
allows for legalized thievery, and the loophole that allows it should
be permanently and unequivocally closed by the Supreme Court.

